Soura Vamseekar Marti

Work / EU AI Assurance OS

EU AI Assurance OS

A fail-closed release gate for AI shipped into the EU: a pinned legal corpus, a human proposal queue, and an Evgraph 0.1.2 scan that must match the evidence pack.

Live2026 – PresentEU AI Act–oriented controls

The problem

Under the AI Act, obligations depend on what a system does and who it affects. Teams discover this late — usually in a review meeting, with a launch date already promised and no record of what was checked.

Release gate

Classify, then queueSystemowner · purposePinned corpusrisk classQueued proposalperson acceptsWhat the gate readsEvidencecitedEvalscoreContractopen BREACHEvgraph 0.1.2pinned scanShared gappack = live 0.1.2 scanControl mode, then decisionPASSINFORMATIONALREVIEWWARNING · APPROVAL_REQUIREDBLOCKEDBLOCKING
A system is classified against a pinned corpus. Mapping proposals wait for a person. The pack and an Evgraph 0.1.2 scan share one gap, then the gate returns PASS, REVIEW, or BLOCKED.

The system enters with its owner and purpose. Risk is classified against a pinned legal corpus. Control mappings stay in a queue until a person accepts them. Cited evidence, the eval score, an open contract breach, and a pinned Evgraph 0.1.2 scan then meet at one shared gap. In-force controls apply INFORMATIONAL, WARNING, APPROVAL_REQUIRED, or BLOCKING. The gate returns PASS, REVIEW, or BLOCKED. It does not certify the system.

How it works

  1. 01

    Register the system

    The AI system is described once. Risk is classified against a pinned legal corpus, so the obligations that follow are explicit rather than assumed.

  2. 02

    The gate runs in CI

    Control mappings are proposals. A person accepts them. They are not auto-applied. In-force controls then use INFORMATIONAL, WARNING, APPROVAL_REQUIRED, or BLOCKING.

  3. 03

    Get a verdict with citations

    The gate returns PASS, REVIEW, or BLOCKED. The evidence pack and a live evgraph-cli 0.1.2 scan report the same current gap. A missing approval timestamp stays inconclusive.

  4. 04

    Seal the record

    The decision, its evidence and its approvals are sealed into an evidence pack and appended to a tamper-evident ledger for whoever asks later.

What it covers

Registry and classification

Risk classes — minimal, limited, high, prohibited — classified against a pinned legal corpus. Control mappings stay proposals until a person accepts them.

Evidence retrieval

all-MiniLM-L6-v2 embeddings over pgvector HNSW, returning citations rather than unsourced prose.

Release gating

PASS / REVIEW / BLOCKED. In-force modes are INFORMATIONAL, WARNING, APPROVAL_REQUIRED, and BLOCKING. The pack and evgraph-cli 0.1.2 share the current gap.

Workflows and oversight

Multi-stage approvals with reviewer assignment, human-oversight evidence capture and notifications.

Drift and lineage

Data-contract drift monitoring with a lineage graph across registered systems.

Sector packs

Insurance, HR and finance overlays as SPI implementations — not live vendor connectors.

Engineering notes

  • Spring Boot 4.1.1 API, Java 17, Tika 4.0.0, and Flyway through V20. Multi-tenant JPA behind JWT and API-key auth.
  • Cited-evidence retrieval runs on DJL + ONNX Runtime with pgvector HNSW, so answers point back at source documents.
  • Eval results return over HMAC-SHA-256 signed callbacks; the queue is durable, so a gate decision survives a worker restart.
  • Append-only audit ledger is hash-chained with verify endpoints, and evidence packs export as JSON with a PDF rendering.

Trade-offs

A person accepts each mapping

instead of auto-applying a control from the corpus

Risk is classified against a pinned legal corpus, and the mapping stays a proposal until someone accepts it. The product does not certify, CE-mark, or issue a legal verdict.

Java-native embeddings via DJL + ONNX

instead of calling a hosted embedding API

Compliance evidence often cannot leave the tenant boundary. Running the model in-process keeps evidence local and removes a per-call dependency.

Hash-chained append-only ledger

instead of an ordinary audit table

An audit table an administrator can edit proves nothing. Chaining makes tampering detectable and gives verify endpoints something to check.

Evidence

V20

Flyway migrations, plus postgres V4

0.1.2

pinned evgraph-cli

4

control modes

3

sector packs